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CURRENT OPERATIONS ABROAD—BOSNIA, NORTH
KOREA, AND SOMALIA

Y 4. AR 5/3: S. HRG. 104-219

Current Operations Abroad - Bosnia,...

HEARING

BEFORE THE


COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 12, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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
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CURRENT OPERATIONS ABROAD—BOSNIA, NORTH KOREA, AND SOMALIA

THURSDAY, JANUARY 12, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Lott, Smith, Hutchison, Inhofe, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Robb, Lieberman, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Donald A. Deline, general counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, deputy chief clerk; Cindy Pearson, security manager; and Bond H. Almand, receptionist.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Jonathan L. Etherton, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Stephen L. Madey, Jr., John H. Miller, Steven C. Saulnier, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Christine E. Cowart, special assistant; Richard E. Combs, Jr., John W. Douglass, and Jeffrey Record, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Menge Crawford, Kathleen M. Paralusz, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants presents: Grayson F. Winterling, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Pamela G.D. Sellars and Richard F. Schwab, assistants to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; David Davis, assistant to Senator Hutchison; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis, assistants to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato and Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; and John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman.

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will please come to order. Because of the classification of the information that will be briefed this morning, I will entertain a motion to close the meeting.

Senator NUNN. I so move.

Chairman THURMOND. Do I hear a second?

Senator EXON. Second.

Chairman THURMOND. The meeting will close. Any objections? [No response.]

Will the clerk please certify that only authorized individuals are present?

Ms. PEARSON. Yes, sir.

Chairman THURMOND. I want to point out that I intend to limit the number of closed hearings. I think the public should be aware of our activities. If possible, I would like to get an unclassified version of this briefing for our members.

I want to welcome our witnesses here today, all of you distinguished gentlemen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. Today is the first meeting of the committee, other than business and organizational meetings, in which we take up matters of national security for which we are responsible. It is appropriate to begin with a look at current operations in some of the key problem areas of the world. We are meeting this morning to receive a briefing from Defense Department and State Department officials on the military situations in Bosnia, North Korea, Haiti, and Somalia.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Walt Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and to three officers of the Joint Staff: Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy; Lt. Gen. Howell Estes, Director for Operations; and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hughes, Director, Intelligence.

Some of you gentlemen have appeared before us in the past and I expect to see you again in the future. I thank you for coming and look forward to working with all of you in pursuit of the Nation's security.

It is my understanding that Mr. Slocombe and Mr. Tarnoff will be present only for the first panel, to brief on Bosnia. Also, I would remind my colleagues that this briefing is intended to focus primarily on military operational questions and not on the broader, underlying policy issues, although Senators certainly may ask whatever questions they wish. I know, for example, that my colleagues on both sides have deep concerns about the policies which undergird our relations toward North Korea.

I want to assure all of you that the committee will begin taking a deeper look at North Korea and other critical international security problems in the coming weeks. In fact, 2 weeks from today, we will hold a hearing on the security implications of the nuclear agreement with North Korea. I expect to have other hearings where we can explore in depth and in detail all the ramifications of U.S. military interventions abroad and not limit ourselves to current operational matters.

The presence of two senior administration officials to brief on Bosnia highlights our continuing concern about that tragic conflict. While the fighting in Bosnia has subsided for the moment, the hatred between the warring parties runs deep and remains

undiminished. Everyone recognizes that the current ceasefire is a fragile and uncertain one. I fear the ceasefire may only serve as a breathing spell for the combatants to rebuild their military strength and then re-open the conflict, even more violently than before.

The future of Bosnia is now in the hands of diplomats, the five-nation Contact Group. I can only hope and pray that this time they are successful because it was flawed diplomacy that led to this conflict in the first place. Now the United States and our allies are confronted with a terrible political, military, and moral dilemma. In such cases, it is tempting to turn to the Armed Forces to rescue the diplomats. But this is unfair to military officers, who are forced to work outside their area of training and expertise to seek solutions. Most importantly, it places our service members in situations for which the military is not best suited and where the sacrifices they are asked to make do not necessarily serve the Nation's interest.

I raise this concern because I believe Bosnia is a specific example of an increasing trend, calling on the military to salvage bad diplomacy, rather than using military force to support a coherent diplomacy that clearly advances the security and welfare of the United States.

This committee must exercise leadership to ensure that this pattern does not repeat itself in other places. We must not allow any more Somalias. We must not allow our forces to be spread so thin around the globe that we are unable to respond when a real threat to our security arises.

We were all relieved that our Haiti operation did not have to be a "forced entry" and did not result in major loss of life, Haitian or American. But the potential for disaster was there.

Recently, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing the U.N. to relieve the current multinational force, which is almost entirely American, and replace it with a U.N. peacekeeping force.

Of course, I am pleased that the United States is no longer going to be responsible for nation-building or creating democracy in Haiti. But at least half the new U.N. force will be Americans, perhaps as many as 3,000 troops. They will have to remain deployed far away, on a still dangerous mission.

I want our briefers to know that this committee will be watching the Haiti mission very closely to ensure that the U.S. military does not remain saddled with a costly, long-term, and dangerous commitment whose connection to the national interest is dubious, at best.

We will also be watching Somalia very closely. U.S. forces have to go back into Somalia soon to cover the final withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers. Most Americans feel that we have paid far too high a price in American blood and resources for the good that we may have done there. The news of a U.S. return to Somalia, however brief, has filled them with alarm. I reluctantly accept that we must ensure the safe and orderly withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeepers. The last contingent to come out will be Pakistanis, part of the same force that came to the aid of Americans pinned down in Mogadishu

during the tragic battle of October 3, 1993. We owe them this support.

But I hope our briefers can assure the committee that the planning for this extraction is sound, that adequate naval and air power will be available to back up the landing party, and that the slightest interference with the withdrawal will be met with sufficient force.

Once again, I thank you gentlemen for coming today and look forward with interest to your briefing.

At this time, I am pleased to ask my distinguished colleague, Senator Nunn, for any opening remarks he would like to offer.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome our witnesses today, key witnesses from both State and Defense, the military part and the civilian leadership. We know these gentlemen well and we know we can rely on their testimony in terms of the situations we face in very difficult parts of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for getting this hearing together at an early date. These are subjects that we are going to be dealing with in the next several weeks and several months; in fact, probably the next several years on some of them. We have a situation in Bosnia that involves one CINC, CINCEUR. We have North Korea, CINCPAC. We have Haiti, CINCUSA, and we have Somalia, CINCCENT. So this involves a wide geography of the world.

Each one of these situations is different, but the common denominator is all of them involve either the participation now or potential participation of our U.S. military forces. So we have a real stake in learning about the best views we have in our executive branch on these subjects.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having the hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony from our witnesses.

Chairman THURMOND. Does any other member have any remarks? [No response.]

Secretary Slocombe, if you will start, followed by Secretary Tarnoff and the other witnesses. If you wish to summarize your testimony to save time, we will include your prepared remarks in the record. Secretary Slocombe, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My colleagues and I welcome the opportunity to begin what I know will be an intense process of consultation and discussion of all these issues during the coming years.

With the committee's permission, I would like to ask that we organize the Bosnia part of the presentation this morning with Peter Tarnoff beginning, by covering our diplomatic efforts. Then I will talk a little bit about current military operations and our proposals to stand ready to assist if a withdrawal of UNPROFOR becomes necessary. Then General Clark will discuss the efforts to improve UNPROFOR and the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

Then, after such further discussion of Bosnia as the committee desires, with your permission we will turn this over to General

Clark, General Hughes, and General Estes for a briefing on current operations and potential trouble spots.

If that procedure is acceptable to the committee, and I believe we have discussed it beforehand, I would like to ask the committee's indulgence to begin with Under Secretary Peter Tarnoff.

Chairman THURMOND. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to appear here this morning before the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the administration's diplomatic strategy and policies regarding Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia. Any discussion of our foreign policy in Bosnia or anywhere else, but especially in an area as critical as Bosnia, must begin with the review and repetition of what our national interests are.

In Bosnia, these are three: first, preventing the spread of fighting into a broader European war that could threaten both our allies and the stability of newly democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe and lead to serious rifts with Russia; second, stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees, providing relief to the victims of the war, and helping to stop the slaughter of innocents; and, third, maintaining a leadership role in European affairs and international institutions by building a coalition of states to work for peace.

We believe that the best path to achieve these interests lies in a negotiated settlement. Let me describe briefly the current diplomatic situation and our prospects for progress.

As you know, we have been working with the Bosnian parties through the Contact Group—U.S., Russian, European, and U.N. representatives—that we established in March of last year to find a negotiated settlement.

Early last year, we brokered and actively supported the federation agreement between the Bosnian Government and members of the Bosnian Croat minority, which has improved the prospects for an overall settlement, helped end the fighting in Central Bosnia, and reopened some humanitarian convoy routes. The United States is making special efforts to support this federation.

Working with and through the U.N. Security Council, we have maintained a thorough sanctions regime on Serbia/Montenegro—and I will come back to this in a moment—and pressed for the establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. We provided it with personnel and \$6 million worth of goods and services.

In terms of our current efforts, Mr. Chairman, our goal is to bring to an end the war in Bosnia in a manner consistent with the Contact Group plan. Over the last month, we developed a three stage, sequenced approach to reach this goal: first, ceasefire; second, formal cessation of hostilities; and, third, a political negotiation centered on the Contact Group plan.

The first two stages are now accomplished and the United Nations has done a good job of formalizing the general points of agree-

ment that were reached during President Carter's trip to the region in December.

Our current task is to succeed in the third phase, the difficult negotiation to find a political settlement.

The 4-month cessation of hostilities is going to be fragile and frequently violated, but it does create a new political environment more conducive to peace negotiations and a political settlement.

We have been urging all parties to work closely and constructively with the U.N. in order to resolve those remaining difficulties. In that regard, we note with interest the statement from Bosnian Serb Karadzic's office that the Serbs are prepared to open up all of the routes in and out of Sarajevo, the so-called "blue routes," notwithstanding their concern about the Igman region.

We have reengaged with our Contact Group partners to seize the momentum created by the cessation agreement. Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke was in Sarajevo on Sunday and Monday to discuss the situation with the Bosnian Government and to reaffirm our support for the Contact Group plan.

On Tuesday, the day before yesterday, the Contact Group political directors met in Paris at a session marked by unity and a shared sense of common purpose. They agreed that the Contact Group map and plan should be the basis for any future negotiations. They also agreed to send the Contact Group experts to the region, to establish a format for negotiations for the parties. This group, including the American representative, Ambassador Charles Thomas, arrived in Sarajevo.

The Contact Group will approach Karadzic, but only to get Pale's acceptance of the plan. No other topics will be raised in the first Contact Group meeting with the Pale Serbs.

Our aim is to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic process by mid-January under the auspices of the Contact Group. We prefer that this take the form of shuttle diplomacy, which allows the Contact Group to put direct pressure on the decision-makers and is preferable to a formal conference or proximity talks or a full-blown Geneva style negotiation.

We all recognize that any negotiation will be very difficult. The United States will make it clear at the same time that we are sticking to the 51/49 percent formula for a territorial divide, although land swaps can be arranged with the consent of both parties. This is a formula that you know has been agreed to by the Bosnian Government several months ago.

We will fully support that government in their efforts to maintain their state as an international entity within its present boundaries.

With regard to sanctions, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention our decision to agree to another 100 days of limited sanctions relief for Serbia, a position which all the Contact Group representatives in the U.N. Security Council, including Russia, will support. In doing so, I would like to stress that this relief is, indeed, very limited, covering only passenger air service to Belgrade, passenger ferry service to Bar, and sporting and cultural contacts; all other sanctions remain in place.

We will consider additional sanctions relief measures only if connected to substantial progress toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia.

On the whole, looking over the past 100-day period, we believe it is fair to say that the border has been effectively closed in the sense that it has become steadily less porous as loopholes were identified and sealed.

The process of closing loopholes on that border accelerated in recent weeks as a direct result of U.S. pressure on Belgrade, the U.N., and the International Conference for the former Yugoslavia, who helped to identify key problem areas and calling for collective and corrective action.

Joint monitoring and Serb activities have largely eliminated the danger of diversion from trains, and better access has allowed these monitors to perform more effectively.

Recently, the monitoring group has reported sharply improved cooperation, including physical barriers at 29 crossings, actions against organized, so-called "ant trade," which is the smuggling by private vehicles, and termination of fuel transit to the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia.

We want to ensure that the level of border closure achieved as a result of recent improvements in Serbian performance becomes the standard for future performance, and we will continue to push for constant improvement. We are insisting at the U.N. on an extension only for another 100 days, with another positive vote by the U.N. Security Council needed to extend again and for a termination of sanctions if Serbian performance deteriorates.

We believe that the extension of sanctions relief will help the overall perspectives and prospects for peace. While the Bosnian Serbs have not yet accepted the Contact Group plan, we have seen progress in the peace process with the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement.

Even though we do not believe that Milosevic's border closure alone made this progress possible, we do believe that it contributed to a heightened sense of Bosnian Serb isolation which helped to achieve the progress that we have seen.

Let me also, Mr. Chairman, say a brief word about Croatia, which is also an important element of this overall strategy.

Throughout the process we will need to continue to pay special attention to Croatia. If President Tudjman comes to believe that we are heading toward a "Bosnia-only" solution, with the Krajina problem pushed aside in a Cyprus-style type accommodation, Zagreb will abort any deal, possibly by disrupting the federation. President Tudjman has already informed us that he intends to end the U.N. presence in his country this spring, a measure which we have grave concerns about.

We have been working closely with Russia and the European Union in the so-called "Zagreb-four" process to reach a negotiated solution to the problems of Serb-occupied Croatia. We believe a good foundation for such a solution has been established, with the accord of opening the Zagreb-Belgrade highway.

We are using the visit to Washington this week of Croatian intelligence chief Tudjman, the son of the President, and Ambassador Zuzul, the personal representative of President Tudjman, to drive

home these points and emphasize that, one way or another, UNPROFOR should remain in Croatia.

I met personally for over 2 hours last night with these representatives and I think that they are taking quite seriously the implications of what it would mean if UNPROFOR is, after a 3-month period, totally removed from Croatia.

Let me, Mr. Chairman, make a few brief concluding points. We believe we should pursue our present course as the best way to secure peace. If we are to use the cessation of hostilities and renewed negotiations to best effect, we will need the support of Congress and the American people.

In this connection, I want to make a brief comment on the proposed legislation which calls for the unilateral lift of the arms embargo.

We have many concerns about a unilateral lift of the arms embargo by the United States, some of which will be elaborated by my colleagues here today. However, my greatest concern is that, if a unilateral lift were to be implemented, however well intentioned, it would likely lead to a wider and bloodier war that would probably turn into an American war.

For that reason, and given some positive movement in the peace process, we hope that this legislation will not be put to a vote in the coming weeks. If it is, we will oppose it.

It may, of course, as we have said, be necessary that a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo will be required. We know that such a time may come. We are ready to consult closely with Congress on how to approach these issues.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to my colleagues, Under Secretary Slocombe and General Clark, to pursue the briefing. Thank you very much.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, let me review in very summary form the elements of our current military efforts. General Clark, and General Clark's colleagues and I can describe these in more detail if the committee wishes. They include U.S. participation with air assets in the enforcement of the no-flight zone and with naval assets in the enforcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, and U.S. and NATO readiness to respond to violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones.

Second, U.S. as well as other NATO aircraft stand ready to provide close air support for UNPROFOR as requested.

Third, the U.S. participates in the enforcement of the maritime embargo on supplies to the former Yugoslavia, with an important exception dealing with arms for Bosnia.

Fourth, the United States provides military support for humanitarian efforts, including virtually daily United States flights into Sarajevo and air drops, as needed. Because the convoys have been going relatively well, there have not been any air drops in recent months.

Finally, the United States participates in the U.N. stability force in Macedonia.

All of these operations are conducted in close cooperation with other NATO and third country forces, and the great majority of them use NATO bases and other assets. The same would be true in the event of a settlement. President Clinton, with the support

of Congress, has committed the United States to participate in a NATO-led settlement implementation force.

The role and importance of UNPROFOR to U.S. interests in Bosnia is, I think, sometimes underestimated. UNPROFOR, for all of its problems, has been the necessary element for a large-scale delivery of food and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones, and its presence has almost certainly reduced the extent and intensity of the fighting.

It is U.S. policy that UNPROFOR should stay in place and continue to do its job. General Clark will review the status of recommendations flowing out of a meeting called at U.S. and French initiative in the Hague last month among the chiefs of defense staffs from contributing countries, to seek to devise ways to strengthen UNPROFOR's effectiveness within its existing mandate.

It is in this context that President Clinton has agreed that, subject to consultation with Congress, if the UNPROFOR forces decide it is necessary to withdraw, and if NATO decides to assist in that withdrawal, the United States would participate in that NATO-led withdrawal operation, including providing ground troops to make the operation effective.

The actual commitment of U.S. forces to this operation is, of course, subject to approval of the detailed plans and a Presidential decision at the time the operation would commence in light of circumstances existing then and, as I said, further consultation with Congress.

The purpose of this undertaking is not to encourage UNPROFOR to leave but the opposite: to increase the confidence of the allied and other nations with troops on the ground so that their forces will stay and will undertake measures to be more effective in carrying out their mandate.

We do not expect that UNPROFOR will be required to leave any time soon. Indeed, we welcome the shift in the discussion among the contributing countries about whether to terminate UNPROFOR's role, recognizing the continuing importance on how to make it more effective.

However, there is sufficient concern that it is appropriate to do realistic and effective NATO planning for the contingency withdrawal of UNPROFOR. That planning is underway at NATO and has been for some time.

NATO military authorities have circulated a preliminary report and recommendation to higher levels in NATO. The next step is review by SACEUR, then by the military committee, followed by review by the NAC. It will be a parallel process of discussing the planning with the UNPROFOR commanders.

Let me outline for the committee some basic principles that would guide any such operation.

First and foremost, the operation would be NATO commanded. U.N. force commanders have agreed to this. This means that no U.S. forces would operate under NATO command. Instead, the operation would be conducted through NATO's Southern Command, headed by U.S. Adm. Leighton Smith, with whom, I know, the committee is familiar.

Second, to preserve the principle of unity of command, UNPROFOR forces would come under NATO command for the pur-

poses of the withdrawal. There would be no dual peace. Planning would size the NATO force that would be available, so that it would be overwhelming in size and capability to be able to deter and, if necessary, to overcome any resistance. Finally, the entire force would operate under NATO rules of engagement.

The United States would not, by any means, provide all of the force. NATO is now in the process of serving its members to determine what forces each might be able to contribute.

The total force which is envisaged in the preliminary planning—and I stress “preliminary”—is in the range of 40,000. We would expect that our share would be between one-third and one-half of that total. Thus, the United States might be in the position of sending something like 20,000 troops beyond those already in the theater. We will continue to consult with this committee and with Congress generally as the situation planning develops on this front.

Before turning to General Clark, I want to raise the issue that I know is on everyone’s mind with respect to Bosnia, which is why not just lift the arms embargo.

No one now would impose an arms embargo on Bosnia if we could start over. The administration has long favored a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, but that is not in the cards, for the near-term, at least. As required by provisions of the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, the administration tabled a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo proposal in the United Nations Security Council. We did not bring that to a vote for a simple reason which will be understandable to members of the legislative body—because it was clear it would have been defeated.

Accordingly, and in compliance with the provisions of the law, beginning on November 12, 1994, U.S. forces ceased to participate in enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia. This was done in ways consistent with the congressional direction, that this action, withdrawing U.S. participation in the enforcement, not impede enforcement of sanctions against Serbia.

It was not, strictly speaking, a unilateral lift because the legal prohibitions on U.S. persons transferring arms to Bosnia remained in effect. We have simply withdrawn from active military participation in the enforcement.

Even so, as the committee knows, this unilateral U.S. action caused real damage to U.S. relations with its allies.

Further, in compliance with the law, we have prepared plans for U.S. training of Bosnia/Herzegovina personnel outside Bosnia and for unilateral lift and to analyze the implications of those actions for presentation to Congress.

Based on that analysis, the administration is even more convinced than we were before that it would be a grave error, with costly consequences for U.S. interests and for Bosnia itself, to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. That conclusion is shared by the U.S. military, both on the Joint Staff and the commanders in the field.

The conclusions and the reasons for those conclusions will be explained in the briefing which General Clark is about to give.

In sum, unilateral lifting of the arms embargo means either leaving Bosnia to its fate, without even the limited sustenance and protection that U.N. efforts now provide, or risking involving the Unit-

ed States in an open-ended military commitment to the Bosnian cause. It would also have grave consequences for our international leadership.

What we should do, instead, is to continue to work on the course outlined by Peter Tarnoff, working within the international community to pursue our key goals: first and foremost, to prevent the conflict from spreading; to limit the scale of the fighting; to provide humanitarian relief; to seek to promote a settlement; and to promote a build-down of arms, not an intensification of the fighting.

This approach requires patience and a commitment to working with other countries. It is not particularly attractive or satisfying emotionally, but it corresponds to our interests and is better than the consequences of expanded war, divisions from our allies, and pressures for U.S. combat intervention that a unilateral lifting of the embargo would bring.

I would now like to turn to General Clark for his presentation.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, we would be glad to hear from you.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, USA, DIRECTOR
FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), JOINT STAFF**

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, Senators, we welcome the opportunity to update you today on this critical issue of Bosnia and other military operations and hot spots. My Joint Staff colleagues and I are prepared to go into some detail with regard to the situation on the ground in Bosnia and other military operations in the Balkans. But in the interest of brevity this morning, in opening I would like to turn right to the study of the implications of unilateral lift which we conducted on the Joint Staff pursuant to the Nunn-Mitchell amendment and then talk about ongoing efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR in its continuing mandate.

Let me run through what we believe will happen if the U.S. determines unilaterally to lift the arms embargo.

First, the decision to lift will itself have immediate adverse repercussions among our allies in NATO, most of whom have warned us strongly about the risks to their soldiers and the adverse international consequences should the arms embargo be unilaterally lifted.

Lifting of the embargo by the President would mean that restrictions on the issuance of munitions export licenses to Bosnia would be lifted. The U.S. Government would change the Arms Export and Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act to allow transfer and sale of arms to Bosnia.

These actions would, of course, place us at odds with U.N. Security Council Resolution 713, which embargoes military support to the countries of former Yugoslavia.

Third, we find that UNPROFOR will withdraw. The contributing nations of UNPROFOR who are in NATO have told us that they will withdraw their forces should we lift the arms embargo unilaterally.

NATO forces and equipment will immediately begin staging to assist in this withdrawal operation. Within weeks of the vote to unilaterally lift and, hopefully before the lift is implemented, the withdrawal operation will commence. Under the best cir-

cumstances, we would expect to receive sniping and intermittent harassment, impeding our withdrawal. Of course, it could be much worse, depending on the other circumstances that come into play at the time, including what the follow-on mission of NATO or U.S. forces would be in the area.

[Deleted.]

Fourth, we would see an immediate fall-off in humanitarian support to the victims of the fighting in Bosnia. The NGOs and PVOs who are assisting in that humanitarian support will also begin to leave and will begin to dismantle their operations in Bosnia as tensions rise and fighting increases.

[Deleted.]

The lifting of the arms embargo would have sent a signal to the Serbs that their strength, relative to the Bosniaks, would only decrease as arms begin to flow in.

[Deleted.]

The humanitarian efforts, as a consequence, will all but stop as Serbs interdict both governmental and non-governmental relief organizations.

Sixth, we expect the Bosniaks also to undertake offensive action, desperate fighting designed to protect their people, their existing territory, and to assure their credibility as a military force worthy of aid, training, and sustainment.

We believe that, despite the Bosniak's superiority and manpower and their notable ongoing efforts to build up their forces, the outcome will generally follow the outlines of the battles around Bihac—initial Bosniak gains, followed by Serb counter-attacks, which are largely successful in cutting off the advancing Bosniak forces.

Seventh, we believe that our lifting of the arms embargo unilaterally will initiate an increased flow of arms through Croatia into Bosnia.

[Deleted.]

The arguments for intervention would be strong. There would be arguments that the purpose of lifting, after all, was to enable the Bosnians to defend themselves, that we cannot allow them to be defeated or allow widespread civilian slaughter while they are attempting to receive the arms and put them to use.

There will be arguments that we must protect Bosnia while the arms are being delivered. There will be arguments that others are already helping the other side.

There will be arguments that if we don't assist, other, more radical, Muslims will come in and take control of the effort. There will be arguments that U.S. airpower can make a critical difference in the fighting on the ground and must be applied quickly lest we be called on to actually put in U.S. ground forces again.

[Deleted.]

While this debate would continue, the regional crisis in the Balkans would intensify. The threat of complete dominance of the region by the Serbs would cause all regional parties to lobby for arms for self protection and to take preventive actions.

Croatia will threaten to enter the war against the Bosniaks and expand the fighting if the United States does not supply arms to

Croatia as well. If we do supply weapons, they may use them to attack and attempt to regain the Krajina.

[Deleted.]

Greece and Turkey, long at odds, may strongly support opposite sides.

This is a recipe for a conflict spinning out of control.

In summary, these are the long-term implications of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo which we believe would occur. First is an Americanization of the war.

We would be held responsible for the intensified and widened fighting and for the breakdown in humanitarian support. Explicit involvement would likely be required, including close air support and ground forces, for ensuring the humanitarian aid flows and for filling the vacuum created by UNPROFOR's withdrawal, unless we wish to see the Bosnian state partitioned between Serbia and Croatia.

Damage to NATO would be extensive and perhaps irreparable. There would be a significant impact on our alliance relationships that would impair our cooperation within NATO and undermine 45 years of alliance cooperation.

Loss of access to key NATO basing infrastructure and overflights is a virtual certainty. NATO relevance will be thrown into doubt at a critical time, when we are attempting to establish NATO as the foundation for a new, European security architecture.

Unilateral lift would also have a detrimental impact on our national credibility, both within the alliance, as I stated, and at the United Nations.

Not complying with the U.N. Security Council resolution would call into question our reliability, motives, and ability to exercise global leadership. Other sanctions, sanctions against Iraq and Libya, which we are struggling to ensure are enforced, would be critically weakened.

Direct confrontation with our allies would become a real possibility, as well as a much more dangerous East-West confrontation.

Finally, unilateral lift is unlikely to provide any reasonable solution to the problems on the ground in Bosnia.

The scenario that I have just sketched out applies primarily to a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. We believe that if we were able to muster the support for a multilateral lift, many of these problems would be obviated.

This is why we believe the best course of action now is to keep UNPROFOR in place. We are working to strengthen UNPROFOR at this time.

An informal meeting of the chiefs of defense staff from the NATO nations, NATO staff, U.N. Secretariat, representatives from Russia, and the commander of UNPROFOR was held in the Hague December 19 and 20. We participated in this and we formulated a number of military recommendations to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness.

Among these recommendations were: enhancing the self defense capabilities of UNPROFOR with additional equipment, communications enhancements, improvements of liaison between UNPROFOR and warring parties; efforts to achieve redistribution of forces on the ground, to include facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to

isolated areas by strengthening U.N. control over some of the routes; and developing an emergency supply plan for Sarajevo and the enclave.

Finally, this meeting of the chiefs of defense staff reaffirmed the unanimous support that all of them have for the crucial importance of maintaining UNPROFOR in position, keeping its mission impartial and under the current mandate of assisting the humanitarian effort, until a negotiated settlement can be reached.

At this time, capitals are examining the potential national contributions that could be made, with an aim toward strengthening UNPROFOR.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This completes my opening statement.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. General Estes, do you care to make a statement?

General ESTES. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. General Hughes, do you care to make a statement?

General HUGHES. Not at this time, sir.

Chairman THURMOND. Then we will proceed now with questions. By tradition, we follow the early bird rule, and, because of the number of witnesses and members, we will limit each member to 6 minutes. I will now take my 6 minutes.

Mr. Tarnoff, to what extent is the Contact Group's negotiations dependent on NATO's presence in Bosnia? Does the threat of NATO force, minimal though it has been, provide incentives to all parties to reach a settlement, or does it encourage the Bosnians to hold out for better terms?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, in my view, the presence of UNPROFOR, backed up by NATO, is absolutely indispensable to the Contact Group effort for two or three reasons. First of all, although there have been problems with the rules of engagement that have been agreed on between UNPROFOR and NATO, nonetheless, the potential of military action still does exist in defense of the UNPROFOR forces, and we think that this is, obviously, a very important element.

Second, NATO provides other services in the area. The no fly zone is clearly an important element in the tactical situation on the ground.

I think that if there were not this NATO/UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia, for many of the reasons that I and my colleagues have discussed before, the prospects for Contact Group success or even progress in the negotiations would be much reduced.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Slocombe, NATO and United Nations forces are supposed to be operating in cooperation. Are there inherent conflicts between U.N. and NATO missions or at least in how they see their respective missions? Would you give some specific examples?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The cooperation between the NATO military commanders and the UNPROFOR commanders has been, I think, very good. There is close consultation and discussion.

However, you have to acknowledge that there is an inherent difference in the way in which the troops on the ground, who are there under a peacekeeping mandate with an "obligation to remain

impartial, and with a disposition which is geared to that mission and not to a warfighting mission, for understandable reasons, adopt a pretty cautious attitude toward anything which they think would cause retaliation by one party or the other or would draw them into the conflict on the side of one party or the other. Therefore, while I think it is absolutely right that the close air support that NATO offers is an essential element of UNPROFOR staying, there have been differences of view about how aggressively that close air support should be exercised, and so on.

I think these arise from the different positions of the two, particularly UNPROFOR relative to NATO, which is, essentially, a warfighting, military alliance.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, if the embargo is lifted as the Bosnians have demanded, do you anticipate that the Bosnian Serbs will preemptively attack? If so, how effective will NATO air power alone be in stopping them?

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

Chairman THURMOND. Mr. Tarnoff, does Russia's current problems with civil war and Chechnya give the West our best possible opportunity for a Bosnian resolution—in other words, without Russia being able to play a spoiling role?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Mr. Chairman, that in our many conversations with the Russians over the past several weeks, while the Chechnya affair has been going on, we have not detected any significant change in their view, except insofar as they have, on several occasions, been relatively more accommodating in cooperating with the Contact Group partners.

The Russians have had somewhat of a philosophical difference with the rest of us during the course of this process. They have believed that Milosevic and Serbia are the key to the answer in Bosnia and, for historical as well as political reasons, they have been more tolerant, more accommodating of Milosevic than we are inclined to do.

That difference remains. But, nonetheless, at a practical level we have found good cooperation between Russia and the other Contact Group members. As I mentioned earlier, Russia has joined the Contact Group mission presently in Sarajevo and there is total agreement at this point that the Contact Group plan should be defended vigorously by all members, including Russia.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, you gave a very concise summary of the study that was done pursuant to the congressional requirement. Who prepared that study?

General CLARK. The Joint Staff did that study, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Was that done by the military, was it done by the civilians, or was it done jointly between the military and civilians?

General CLARK. It was done wholly by the Joint Staff, by the military elements, sir.

Senator NUNN. By the military. Did the civilian leadership of the Pentagon or other parts of the executive branch play a role? Did they basically guide you? Did they veto anything, or was this a pure military analysis?

General CLARK. We did it as a pure military assessment. We did brief it to our civilian leaders, and they asked questions. They

asked us to look at certain aspects of it. We went back and looked at those aspects.

Senator NUNN. Did you make any fundamental changes?

General CLARK. Absolutely not. This is a military assessment, Senator.

Senator NUNN. General Estes, do you agree with this assessment?

General ESTES. Senator Nunn, I was a direct participant with General Clark in the preparation of that assessment. So I fully agree with it.

Senator NUNN. Has anything been changed in that assessment as it went through the civilian review process, either from the Department of Defense, or the State Department, or the National Security Council, or the White House that is significant in your mind or that in any way dilutes your support for the outcome?

General ESTES. Absolutely not, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. General Clark, the same question?

General CLARK. Absolutely not. This is the military assessment that I presented this morning.

Senator NUNN. General Hughes, could you answer those two questions for me, please, sir?

General HUGHES. Yes, sir. I am going to reply with the same two answers. I was a participant also. Intelligence information was used in this study and I concur with the findings of the study.

Senator NUNN. Did this study get briefed to the Joint Chiefs or were the Joint Chiefs themselves involved in the study?

General CLARK. We did brief this study to the Joint Chiefs. We also had elements of some of the service staff participating. We have worked these findings also with the commanders in the field. We took input from them in preparing these studies. So I think this is a comprehensive military assessment, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Do the Joint Chiefs each agree with the study or did they ever give their view?

General CLARK. When this was briefed in the tank, to the best of my recollection, we had the full agreement of all of the Chiefs. I will turn to General Estes, who was there with me.

General ESTES. Senator Nunn, we took this to the tank two different times. The first time, it was the intent of the briefing that we were giving to the Chiefs to solely answer the questions we were asked by Congress to address. Their view was that we make it a more complete briefing and gave us some additional guidance on how they wanted it expanded to cover all the aspects and the implications of lifting the arms embargo. We added those pieces to our military assessment.

Senator NUNN. Is it your view that all the Chiefs agree with the outcome of the study?

General ESTES. It's my view that the briefing that General Clark just gave you is also agreed to by the Chiefs.

Senator NUNN. How about the commanders in the field, the head of our European forces and the other commanders that are in the chain of command. Have they been briefed and do they agree with this assessment?

General ESTES. Sir, the briefing was sent to the European Command. Whether or not it was given to General Joulwan, the Com-

mander of the European Command, I can't tell you. But I have to assume that it was. The EUCOM staff, who came back to us with comments, was in agreement with the briefing.

Senator NUNN. So your assumption is that General Joulwan also agreed? You don't know that personally, but that's your assumption?

General ESTES. That's my personal assumption.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Shifting subjects, Secretary Tarnoff, you mentioned in your statement, I believe you or Secretary Slocombe, about the Croatsians. They are in town now and you are concerned about them basically saying that the U.N. forces have to get out by a date certain when the mandate expires in the spring.

I am going to ask these same questions to the military. What would be the implications if they did give that withdrawal order and I assume they have the legal right to tell the U.N. to get out of Croatia? Right? What are the implications of that if that were to happen in the spring?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Senator, there are two kinds of implications, one with respect to the situation in Croatia and the second regarding the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia, which supports the operation in Bosnia.

I would like, with your permission, to answer the first question and to defer to my colleagues from the Department of Defense for the second question.

We believe, and so stated to the representatives of the Croatian Government last night, that if UNPROFOR is expelled, is asked to leave, after a 3- to 6-month period, depending on the time table, that the risk of conflict in Croatia increases substantially because the Serbian population in Croatia would feel exposed and vulnerable. The UNPROFOR forces, which have been guarding weapons depots and also have been in certain places, interposing themselves between the forces, could not be replaced by any other international presence. For this reason, I urged very strongly on the representatives of the Croatian Government that we take advantage, working very closely with them and other members of the international community in the coming months, to find a way for those essential functions to be maintained.

This is not to say that the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia has worked to everyone's satisfaction. It certainly has not. It has its imperfections, as it does in Bosnia itself. But the absence of something comparable is very worrisome, and that is the view that we expressed.

Now, with regard to your second question, I would defer to my colleagues.

Senator NUNN. I think my time has expired, but could you just briefly answer about the military implications of U.N. forces being kicked out of Croatia?

General CLARK. This will require development of a different logistics and command and control system for the United Nations because that is their headquarters. They are in Zagreb. So we have some 19,000 U.N. personnel deployed there. Those people would have to move. Some functions would have to be deployed somewhere else. Some functions would probably be terminated.

It would be a major change in the U.N. operation. It would be highly disruptive to the ongoing operations in Bosnia, not only directly to command and control but also, for example, the convoys that are going in to Bihac, to try to supply Bihac, are being staged out of Croatia.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, if I could, I would add one important clarification on that. Tudjman has said that, even if the U.N. forces had to leave, leave off enforcing their intra-Croatian role, he would be willing to work out some arrangement for them to go on doing their Bosnian role. The degree to which that is workable or not is at best dubious and, in any event, if there were an increase in fighting in Croatia itself, with the best will in the world it would be very difficult to continue to support the humanitarian operation through Croatia.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. I will ask Senator Cohen to take over until I get back.

Senator COHEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I am next in line today.

Let me say that I think the U.N. performance in Bosnia has been humiliating. I remember at the beginning of this past year, 1994, the American military forces said there was going to be a change in how UNPROFOR operates over there. When Lieutenant General Rose first took office, it seemed he was sending signals that there was going to be a change in the way things were going to operate.

In fact, he has become even more pliable to the Serbs' demands than ever before. UNPROFOR has had problems in delivering food, medicines, and humanitarian aid to the civilians who are suffering from this war. Today, as a result of what has taken place, we now have difficulty delivering food, medicine, and supplies to our own UNPROFOR forces, another act, I think, of humiliation.

The U.N. declared a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo but then refused to enforce it. Now we have a situation where the Serbs have a declared exclusion zone for U.N. forces delivering humanitarian assistance.

UNPROFOR has been humiliated, it has been emasculated by having its own forces detained and used as human shields against NATO air attacks. In fact, some UNPROFOR forces seem to have become willing hostages, out playing soccer, field hockey, and having feasts with their captors. The Stockholm Syndrome seems to be in place over there. They have become a tool, an absolute tool, of Serb strategy.

So I would suggest that the first thing we do is change the leadership over there. I think Lieutenant General Rose has to go. I think Mr. Akashi has to be replaced. I think the U.N. no-fly zones and weapons exclusion zones in Bosnia, including the SAMs, have to be enforced, and I don't think UNPROFOR ought to tolerate check points by any of the Serbs, or pay tools or extortion.

I think we ought to organize the UNPROFOR forces along military lines, including armored vehicles, whether or not the Serbs object to that. Finally, I think that the use of force should not be limited to specific offending targets.

If UNPROFOR refuses to adopt this approach, then I think we ought to get out as quickly and as orderly as possible, and any attempt on the part of the Serbs to interfere with that ought to be met with overwhelming and, I would say, disproportionate force. Unless we take that particular position, I think we are going to see a continuation of the humiliation of the entire U.N. operation.

With respect to the use of air attacks, I read an article in the "Naval Institute Proceedings" which even calls into question our ability to carry that out. One of the pilots said we have to take photographs of their positions on ground through hand-held cameras out of F-18 cockpits. If that's the best we can do about hard targeting, we are in deep trouble over there.

So I would like to know what is being done to correct that particular situation. That article was written by Tony Capaccio—I believe he is an F-18 pilot—to correct the situation if we had to engage in air strikes against specific targets.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let's take the first part, about the F-18.

Senator COHEN. Okay. Let's take the first part.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I mean let's take the second part, the specific question about the F-18 first.

Senator COHEN. Start with whatever you want.

General CLARK. First of all, I think we have a fairly good targeting system in place. We have a number of reconnaissance elements over there. We know where their targets are. We have about one third of the targets.

But when you are dealing with forces moving around on the ground, we have to face reality here. Air power is not going to be effective in stopping a ground assault. There are some inherent limitations in air power. And even in the cases of trying to strike one tank, that is a very tough problem in that terrain, in that climate.

So I think our targeting system, as far as NATO and the United States are concerned, is in place. But trying to apply air power to that terrain, against very discriminate objectives, to accomplish political ends, is a very tough problem.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Could I just make one point specifically on that?

The implication of the question may be that somehow the U.N. has restricted what kind of intelligence activities we can conduct in Bosnia. If that is the implication of the question, it's just not true. I have no doubt that if the pilot said he took pictures with a hand-held camera from his F-18, he did. But that, to put it mildly, is only a tiny fraction of the way in which we acquire intelligence about targets and so on in Bosnia.

Senator COHEN. Well, according to the pilot, there is an insufficiency of imagery collection that would allow the kind of targeting that might be necessary.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, my colleagues can say this more authoritatively, but collecting target information about where individual military, artillery pieces such as tanks or whatever they are, are located is a formidable task.

General HUGHES. If I might chime in, sir, we have adequate target acquisition means, to include imagery, from not only overhead systems but from air breathing systems. There is no need for a pilot to have to take a picture out of the cockpit. I am not saying

that he did not do that, but I am telling you directly that adequate support is in place for pilots for targeting for air strikes. I would like to look more fully into this allegation. I will look more fully into it because it does not sound correct to me.

Senator COHEN. It was in the December 5 issue of "Defense Week," on page 2. I call your attention to it.

General HUGHES. All right, sir.

[The information follows:]

First, I fully agree that satellite system products—in fact, products from national and theater collection assets—must be more readily available to tactical users. Dissemination is the intelligence community's biggest shortfall, and we are working hard on many programmatic, architectural, and procedural initiatives to improve it. I urge you to support these initiatives, which I would be pleased to discuss at your convenience.

Although imagery dissemination was not the central target of Commander Moore's criticism, he certainly did refer to the "trickle down" of national and theater imagery. Imagery dissemination to communication bandwidth-limited users (like aircraft carriers) has been a historical challenge. This is being addressed by joint programs like the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), and by "end-to-end" imagery architecture being developed by the Central Imagery Office (CIO) as a response to lessons learned during Desert Storm. Navy programs like Challenge ATHENA are also addressing bandwidth limitations by supplementing military communications with leased commercial satellite communications.

The real concerns in Commander Moore's article were the utility of a slow, inflexible air tasking mechanism and the need for more tactical air reconnaissance assets to directly support operating forces below the JTF Commander. Commander Moore's central point is that, in a chaotic, confused and dynamic ground battle involving mobile weapons, the air command and control system must facilitate an aviator and his immediate support base to rapidly adapt and respond—*while airborne*—to changes on the ground. Moreover, in addition to a fast and flexible command and control system—allowing our forces to "turn inside" the enemy's decision cycle, even while en route the target—aviators need the *right kind* of imagery. In Commander Moore's case, the right kind of imagery is the product of *tactical reconnaissance*, not strategic (or national) imagery. Commander Moore defined this as "timely, detailed imagery oriented to a pilot's attack heading and altitude." Commander Moore further points out that the naval carrier aircraft designed to provide tactical reconnaissance—RF-14s—are too few in number and too much in demand by the JTF Commander to meet the fast-breaking requirements of tactical units.

In other words, satellites and other national systems are not currently designed to provide the kind of imagery required by Commander Moore, nor are they likely to be in the future. They provide superb intelligence for many other missions tasked to a carrier air wing, ranging from production of basic target graphics for fixed sites to support of detailed strike mission planning. The intelligence community has several programs in place to improve collection and dissemination of satellite imagery, but these will not replace the need for tactical air reconnaissance at the tactical level. I urge you to support programmed enhancements to our manned tactical air reconnaissance program, such as the Navy and Marine Corps' Reconnaissance Capable (RC) F/A-18, the Air Force's "Pacer Coin" C-130, and the Army's Air Reconnaissance Low (ARL) DHC-7. These provide the kind of imagery Commander Moore needs. Also, several UAV programs, including HUNTER and PREDATOR, show great potential for providing the kind of real-time imagery identified by Commander Moore. These UAVs, along with the data links and processing equipment that facilitate direct delivery of products to users, merit your support.

Finally, Commander Moore's "35mm" solution to his problem demonstrates once again that the imagination and ingenuity of those closest to the challenge are tough to beat. Better is occasionally "the enemy of good enough." Thus, as leader of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) portion of the Joint Staff's Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA), I intend to look more closely into Commander Moore's recommendation concerning wider use of hand held cameras. His recommendation recognizes that the shortfalls discussed in his article have less to do with technology than with fully exploiting and supporting human capabilities in the cockpit.

Senator COHEN. My time has expired, but I would like to still hear a response regarding the performance of UNPROFOR.

General CLARK. First of all, we agree with many of your points, Senator, that UNPROFOR needs to express itself more forcefully in dealing with the Serbs. Rose is rotating this month. His current replacement is in town today, in fact. Lt. Gen. Ruppert Smith is going in there. We hope he will be more forceful.

Senator LOTT. Excuse me. Where is this new general from?

General CLARK. He is also from the United Kingdom.

Senator LOTT. Thank you.

General CLARK. We do believe that we can take actions which will strengthen UNPROFOR's hand in Bosnia. Among these are the provision of additional equipment, such as night vision goggles and secure communications, some more armored vehicles, and encouraging them to take more effective positions to be able to block Serb intimidation. We have efforts underway right now to address these issues.

But I think the fundamental issue that you raise is whether we are better off with them there or pulling them out.

We have looked at it. We believe we are better off with them there. As imperfect and flawed as their operation has been, they are still more successful in delivering humanitarian support to the populace, which is, after all, their mission, than what we would have if they left.

It is a flame retardant. It is not going to put out the fire of conflict there, but it does retard its ability to spread.

So our strategy would be to strengthen UNPROFOR rather than calling for its withdrawal.

Senator COHEN. Is there any comment on Mr. Akashi?

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, Senator, I might, in a somewhat broader perspective, say that I agree with your characterization of the performance. We have had the tension in the relationship with the U.N. that was described by Under Secretary Slocombe. Basically, people on the ground, who have been very mindful not only of the safety of their forces on the ground but of the humanitarian mission they have been performing, have been, in our view, too cautious, too prudent to demonstrate to the Bosnian Serbs that UNPROFOR, assisted by NATO, has backbone.

Nonetheless, we have to admit for whatever reason that the situation has improved in recent weeks. There are no longer UNPROFOR forces being detained or being harassed as much as was the case before. The private voluntary organizations report that the relief operations are substantially freer now than at any time in the last 2 to 2½ years. That could change at any moment. You are absolutely right. But the fact of the matter is that people in Bosnia itself are living better.

The Bosnian Government released some interesting figures last week, Senator, which was that, according to their calculation, in 1993, approximately 8,000 citizens of their country, under their control, both military or civilian, were either killed or missing in action. That figure went down to 2,500 in 1994.

It is not a perfect situation, but there has been progress and, based on that progress, we believe that the diplomatic track, in-

cluding the maintenance of UNPROFOR, is the best way to proceed, at least for the months to come.

Senator COHEN. My time has expired. I believe Senator Exon is next.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen, I want to join in welcoming you here. Let me start out, if I might, with questions of Mr. Slocombe and Mr. Tarnoff.

Gentlemen, what promises, specific or implied, has the United States made to the international community for its peacekeeping ground troops if a lasting peace agreement is reached? What is the estimated annual cost for such a peacekeeping force?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, at the very beginning of this administration President Clinton indicated that if—

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I just can't hear. I'm sorry.

Senator WARNER. We beg your pardon.

Senator EXON. Please proceed.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At the very beginning of this administration, President Clinton indicated that if there were a peaceful settlement, an agreed settlement by the parties, the United States would participate, including with ground forces, subject to consultation and support from Congress, in a NATO-led implementation force for Bosnia.

There has been detailed planning for what might be involved in such a force, and I will turn to General Clark to describe that briefly. The commitment is a public commitment and has been in effect now for almost 2 years.

I would ask General Clark to describe what the military's current thinking is about what will be entailed.

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

From these additional forces, we would anticipate that there would be a sizable U.S. commitment. We have not yet received a firm request from NATO for that commitment. We have had informal discussions. Many countries have informally indicated what they would intend to contribute. But that is a process that is ongoing right now.

In terms of where the planning stands, there is a detailed plan that has been presented to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joulwan. He has looked at that. He is briefing that to NATO headquarters, and he will receive guidance from that. All of that is to occur within the next week or so. Then we will be getting a specific request for forces toward the end of this month, Senator.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. With respect to the issue of cost, there is no question that this would be a costly operation. I cannot give you a figure. But precisely to avoid the problems that Senator Cohen's question raises—entirely legitimate criticisms of how UNPROFOR has been operated—it would be our view that, if the United States were going to go in to such an operation, it would go in as part of a force that was really configured to carry out a military mission. It would be a substantial size force. The numbers that have been talked about have been on the order of 50,000, of which the United States would supply about half.

Senator EXON. What about dollars? Can you be more specific in that? Can you give us some ballpark figures at the present time on an annual cost basis?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I know that such figures have been developed and I can provide them for the record. But I don't want to mislead you. It will be a substantial number because it is a substantial force.

[The information follows:]

ANNUAL COST OF A NATO PEACE OPERATION FOR BOSNIA

[Deleted.]

Senator EXON. Well, Mr. Slocombe and Mr. Tarnoff, what promises has the United States made, then, on another very important subject, either as a stand-alone nation or as a member of NATO, for emergency extraction and evacuation of allied peacekeeping troops already on the ground in Bosnia, should that become necessary? That seems to be an ever-increasing concern in many of the talks that I have had with many individuals.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As I outlined in my opening statement, in early December of this year, the President agreed, subject to consultation with Congress, that the United States would be willing to participate again, including with ground troops, in an extraction operation for the UNPROFOR forces that are now present in Bosnia if it were decided that it was necessary to extract them. So, again, there has been a public commitment to that effect. There is no secret or private deal beyond what has been said in public.

Senator EXON. Has there been any cost estimate on such an operation?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Again, the planning on that is in a more preliminary state than with respect to the implementation force. But, again, the idea would be to go in, as I think I said in the statement, with a force of substantial size that would be able to overwhelm any resistance and, hopefully, to deter any resistance. So it would be a force on the order of 40,000 or 50,000 for this mission. Also, the cost would be very substantial. Again, I cannot give you numbers.

Senator EXON. I understand, I understand.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We can get you a number for the implementation force because the planning is farther along.

[The information follows:]

NATO is continuing with very detailed planning for the peace implementation force. The United States is doing its planning based on the tentative assumption that we will be providing a force about the size of one division and associated support troops, perhaps 15-20,000 troops total. Contributing such a force will cost between \$1 billion and \$2 billion for 1 year.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If you do not hold me to the numbers, it will be the same order of magnitude, adjusted for time, in the extraction force.

Senator EXON. Mr. Tarnoff, do you believe it is possible to get the United Nations to reverse its position and lift the arms embargo on Bosnia or will our allies and Russia continue to block such a move?

Mr. TARNOFF. I believe, Senator, that there are circumstances in which we could obtain a majority in the Security Council and avoid

a veto in the Security Council which would allow a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. Let me tell you what those conditions are. I am not going to predict that they will occur.

But I think if the Bosnian Serbs demonstrate in the coming weeks that they are not serious about the peace process that I described in detail beforehand, if it appears that they are mobilizing for increased ground actions, if they continue to increase their potential for what Senator Cohen referred to as humiliation of UNPROFOR on the ground, I think in the informal discussions that we have had with some of our allies and the troop contributors, they, too, do not want to be in Bosnia indefinitely. They, too, do not want to leave Bosnia without having something left behind for the Bosnian Government to be able to do, and they accept our moral argument that the Bosnian Government has been disadvantaged.

So in those circumstances, I think it is perfectly possible that we would be able to obtain the necessary votes in the Security Council for a multilateral lift of the arms embargo.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Tarnoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. Senator HUTCHISON.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to say that I want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Cohen. I think we have made some strategic errors there and I think it is time for us to reassess. I do not think continuing the policies there that we have had in the past is the correct approach.

I would like to ask several different questions. First, I would like to ask General Clark how many U.S. troops are now in the area?

General CLARK. We have inside Bosnia right now about a dozen soldiers who are there as liaison. We have a number of other soldiers in the area participating, airmen and sailors participating in four different operations.

Senator HUTCHISON. There are a dozen serving as liaison, is that right?

General CLARK. In task force Provide Promise, which is doing humanitarian support, we have 725 people. In the enforcement of the no-fly zone, Deny Flight—

Senator HUTCHISON. Excuse me. Would you say under what auspices each of these is—NATO, U.N. or what?

General CLARK. Task force Provide Promise is a NATO humanitarian initiative. Deny Flight is also a NATO operation, with 8,300 personnel. Sharp Guard is a NATO sanctions enforcement operation in the Adriatic, with 1,089 personnel. And we have a task force in Macedonia consisting of 560 personnel, who are part of UNPROFOR. That is the total of the forces.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would just make one observation about those numbers. A substantial part of the Deny Flight personnel are the personnel on the Eisenhower Carrier battle group, which is committed to the Deny Flight operation.

Senator HUTCHISON. All right. General Clark, again, how many arms or how much arming is there of the Bosnians now that we are not enforcing the embargo?

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. So it is basically [deleted].

General CLARK. Correct.

Senator HUTCHISON. [Deleted.] And a few grenades or some grenades. All right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And it mostly arrives [deleted].

Senator HUTCHISON. This may be a totally unfair question, but can you give me any relationship to what the Serbs have versus the Bosnians in any kind of percentage?

General CLARK. We can. We can lay out the complete breakdown and balance of forces. We have that information.

I know that our J-2 will have that available. I have it on a slide here if I can just take a moment to find it.

Senator HUTCHISON. And is this significantly improved since we have stopped enforcing the arms embargo, or is it about the same?

General CLARK. The Bosnians have added to their military strength in the last year because they have more equipment, more equipment to arm troops with. They have a material advantage.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is not to any significance because of the change in U.S. enforcement policy.

Senator HUTCHISON. So the smuggling has not increased much since we were not enforcing?

General CLARK. No. We have not detected any change in that, to the best of my knowledge. That is still going on. It was never coming by ship through the Adriatic, and that is the part that we were enforcing. [Deleted.]

Mr. SLOCOMBE. [Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. General Clark, are we doing any enforcement of the arms embargo at this time?

General CLARK. We are enforcing the arms embargo against Serbia and the Serbian province of Montenegro. So our ships in the Adriatic, which were previously enforcing the arms embargo against all the countries of former Yugoslavia, now, if they were to determine that a ship had arms on it and the arms were bound for Bosnia, they would let that ship proceed. But if the arms were bound for Serbia, they would stop it and divert it.

May I provide just a quick summary of what we are looking at in the way of balance of forces?

[Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. I appreciate that. My time is up.

I would just like to ask one quick question of either Secretary Tarnoff or Secretary Slocombe.

If the U.N. troops did withdraw, what do you think the chances are that Germany would become more involved?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the chances of Germany becoming involved are very low.

Mr. TARNOFF. The Germans have made clear, especially with respect to any operation on the ground, although they have participated in some of the air drop operations, that they would not commit forces to the former Yugoslavia. So, even with the greater inclination the Germans are now showing for international peacekeeping, it would not occur here.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, let me ask you first. From your testimony, I gather it is an understatement to say that the military opposes the unilateral lifting of the embargo.

General CLARK. Senator, that is correct. We do oppose the unilateral lifting of the embargo.

Senator LEVIN. What is the position of the military on the multilateral lifting of the embargo? Do you favor it at this point?

General CLARK. At this point, we believe the best course of action is to keep UNPROFOR in place and build on the cessation of hostilities in an effort to get a negotiated settlement on the basis of accepting the Contact Group proposal as the starting point for the negotiations.

Senator LEVIN. Does that mean that, at this point, you do not favor the pursuit of a multilateral lifting at the U.N.?

General CLARK. That remains an option that has to be considered—

Senator LEVIN. I know it remains an option, but does the military favor exercising that option at this point?

General CLARK. On the 12th of January? Absolutely not.

Senator LEVIN. Does the administration favor now seeking, at this point, the multilateral lifting? If you could get it at the U.N., would you?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, we can't get it.

Senator LEVIN. Let me ask Secretary Tarnoff. Does the administration favor, now, lifting the embargo multilaterally?

Mr. TARNOFF. We would like, Senator, to be in a position to have consultations with allies who are disposed to begin the planning of the multilateral lifting of the operation.

Senator LEVIN. No, no—not operation. Do you favor multilateral lifting of this embargo now?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Could I try to answer that, sir?

Senator LEVIN. No. I just need a yes or a no. If you can't give me a yes or a no, don't give me the jumble.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If you want a one word answer—

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It's no. But this is because there are not the votes now.

Senator LEVIN. No, no. That is another issue. If you had the votes now, do you favor it?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. It is the position of the administration that the embargo ought to be lifted multilaterally.

Senator LEVIN. If you had the votes, you'd want to lift it now?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Okay. Now the reason that you don't pursue it is you say we don't have the votes. As you all know, around here as legislators, if you don't have the votes, you don't pursue things. But that is wrong. We do pursue things—even though we don't have the votes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But not when you know you're going to lose for sure.

Senator LEVIN. Oh, yes, we do. There are a lot of reasons for pursuing legislation.

Senator COHEN. I think yesterday was a prime example. [Laughter.]

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, to get to your question, I think there are more reasons than just the vote question.

Senator LEVIN. Let me give you a number of reasons for doing it. Number one, you may have made a commitment to do something.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Of course.

Senator LEVIN. The administration made a commitment to us that it would seek the multilateral lifting. I believe the spirit of that commitment was that you would pursue that to a vote. You can read that letter of the President technically, if you want, but I believe the spirit of that commitment was that he would pursue a vote at the United Nations win or lose.

Number two, there are other reasons for doing it. There are times you want to start a process of making it clear who it is that opposes it and why. The debate can educate at times.

Now there are other reasons used around here which are not as noble or justifiable, involving embarrassment and all the rest. I am not talking about that. I am talking about legitimate reasons of making it clear who opposes it and trying to educate the world or the public as to what an issue is.

There are lots of reasons for pursuing votes other than that you expect to win. May I say there are other legitimate reasons. I am going to leave it at that because I have a lot of other questions.

I don't think the administration wants to lift it multilaterally at this time. That is my own belief, despite what you have just told me. I am just going to tell you that flat-out. I don't believe that you want it, and if you did, you'd make a much stronger effort to get it and you'd pursue it to a vote. But so be it. That is my opinion as to what is really going on here and we might as well be straight with each other.

Next, we have sanctions on against Serbia right now. Those sanctions are in domestic law. They are not just in the executive order, they are in domestic law.

Do you intend to abide by the law of the United States which says that we will not have activities with Serbia in the absence of congressional approval? Is it your intention to comply with that law? Secretary Tarnoff?

Mr. TARNOFF. Senator, I am not familiar with that provision. I will have to get back to you with a more informed response.

[The information follows:]

[Mr. Tarnoff did not provide a response. If received, response will be retained in committee files.]

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with that provision, Secretary Slocombe?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of the things I learned as a lawyer is never to comment on what a statute says unless I have read the actual words of the statute.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Obviously we will comply with the law.

Senator LEVIN. All right. I would urge that you both become familiar with that law and I am surprised that you are not.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At the moment, we have no intention of lifting the sanctions on Serbia.

Senator LEVIN. Well, you're voting at the U.N. to lift them with respect to two or three activities at the U.N. for 100 days.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Do you have the cite for the statute?

Senator LEVIN. Oh, I don't have it in my mind, its number, but I'm surprised you are not familiar with it. I urge you to become familiar with it because that could become a real issue.

[The information follows:]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
PENTAGON,
Washington, DC, January 19, 1995.

Hon. CARL LEVIN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR LEVIN: At the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on Bosnia last Thursday, you inquired about the administration's compliance with Section 1511 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act ("the Levin Amendment").

Although the United States has supported a United Nations resolution providing limited sanctions relief to Serbia and Montenegro, the President has not yet modified or waived any of the relevant regulations insofar as they apply to actions of U.S. persons and, therefore, there has been no occasion for a certification under Section 1511. I am assured by the State Department and the Serb Sanctions Task Force that they will consult fully with you on any contemplated changes in U.S. sanctions regulations in support of the peace process and comply with the law.

I hope this is helpful. I look forward to working closely with you in the future.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE.

Subtitle B—Policies Regarding Specific Countries

SEC. 1511. SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

50 USC 1701
note.

(a) **CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH SANCTIONS.**—The sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, that were imposed by or pursuant to the following directives of the executive branch shall (except as provided under subsections (d) and (e)) remain in effect until changed by law:

(1) Executive Order 12808 of May 30, 1992, as continued in effect on May 25, 1993.

(2) Executive Order 12810 of June 5, 1992.

(3) Executive Order 12831 of January 15, 1993.

(4) Executive Order 12846 of April 25, 1993.

(5) Department of State Public Notice 1427, effective July 11, 1991.

(6) Proclamation 6389 of December 5, 1991 (56 Fed. Register 64467).

(7) Department of Transportation Order 92-5-38 of May 20, 1992.

(8) Federal Aviation Administration action of June 19, 1992 (14 C.F.R. Part 91).

(b) **PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE.**—No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by law may be obligated or expended on behalf of the government of Serbia or the government of Montenegro.

(c) **INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any assistance from that institution to the government of Serbia or the government of Montenegro, except for basic human needs.

(d) **EXCEPTION.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt from sanctions imposed against Serbia and Montenegro that are described in subsection (a) those United States-supported programs, projects, or activities that involve reform of the electoral process, the development of democratic institutions or democratic political parties, or humanitarian assistance (including refugee care and human rights observation).

(e) **WAIVER AUTHORITY.**—(1) The President may waive or modify the application, in whole or in part, of any sanction described in subsection (a), the prohibition in subsection (b), or the requirement in subsection (c).

(2) Such a waiver or modification may only be effective upon certification by the President to Congress that the President has determined that the waiver or modification is necessary (A) to meet emergency humanitarian needs, or (B) to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is acceptable to the parties.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Slocombe, you said that the President's public commitment is that troops of ours will go to help extricate all these forces in the event they have to be extricated, subject to the consultation and support of Congress. The second time you phrased it, you said subject to consultation from Congress.

Are you making a commitment here that you will not be utilizing American forces in any extraction effort without the support of Congress? Is that what you meant to say?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As a practical matter, the administration, no administration, can carry out substantial military operations without the support of Congress.

Senator LEVIN. Are you going to seek the formal support of Congress prior to utilizing American forces in any extraction?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is obviously a different question and the form of that support is one of the subjects which is always discussed in contexts like this, and it will be true in this case.

Senator LEVIN. All right. Let me say one thing about UNPROFOR. I am a critic of UNPROFOR, too. I have to tell you that I happen to agree with much of what Senator Cohen said. But there is no use kidding ourselves as to why UNPROFOR is as inept as they are. It's partly because they are inept inherently, but partly it is because the people with troops on the ground do not want them to do anything other than what they've done. Is that right, Secretary Tarnoff?

Mr. TARNOFF. That's correct, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. So we might as well also say look, it's England, France, and Russia which are saying they don't want more forceful air strikes. General, do you agree with that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, then General?

General CLARK. That's correct.

Senator LEVIN. Okay. I am a critic of UNPROFOR. I think they are a fiasco. But we also have to be straight identifying this, and one of the reasons that they are not more forceful is that the folks at the Security Council, except us and a few others, do not want them to so be, particularly the folks with the troops on the ground. So we might as well be straight on that issue, too, and start pointing the finger, not just at UNPROFOR, which deserves plenty of fingers pointed at it—and I would be delighted if Akashi got out of there. Let me tell you, I think he should go and Rose should go. I happen to agree with that. I think what they have done is awful in terms of the U.N.

But there is an underlying problem here which we might as well be straight about. It is that they are reflecting the views of members of the Security Council with troops on the ground and that is a fact that would stop them from doing what we believe is forceful, even if they were competent, which they are not.

Mr. TARNOFF. You are absolutely right. Your construct is what we face. From their perspective—and I am not defending it—but from their perspective, they believe that, despite the humiliations, the restrictions, the inefficiencies of having this force on the ground, it does contribute to the humanitarian relief and to a better situation with respect to the military situation. That is their calculation.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. I have a request of the chair.

There are a number of military experts, or some, who I think we should consult with relative to what would happen if there were a unilateral or multilateral lifting of the embargo. We have heard some very powerful testimony, I believe, from General Clark this morning. Our NATO commander and General Smith have also laid out certain real, big problems if there were a multilateral, or a unilateral, lift, for that matter, and I would ask the chair, the acting chair of the committee, whether or not it would be possible to ask some military people or some former military people on the other side of this question if they would comment on those problems that would be created, which have been very properly identified by the general. Could we consider that?

Senator COHEN. I would be happy to pass on your request to the chair.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, January 31, 1995.

Hon. GEORGE SHULTZ,
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On January 12, 1995 the Senate Armed Services Committee received a briefing from the staff of the Joint Chiefs on current military operations, including the situation in Bosnia. Some members of the committee felt the discussion of the Bosnian conflict was not sufficiently illuminating, and suggested that we seek additional views. At the request of Senator Carl Levin, the committee would like to solicit your views on the implications of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.

At the January 12 hearing, Gen. Wesley Clark of the Joint Staff, echoing the views expressed earlier by Adm. Leighton Smith, NATO Southern Commander, raised a number of questions that have been commonly posed in regard to lifting the embargo. I enclose these questions, and would be grateful for your response. I invite you to respond to them as soon as possible for inclusion in the hearing record.

With best wishes and warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

STROM THURMOND,
Chairman.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Who would provide arms to the Muslims and how would they deliver them?

Who would train them in use of the new weapons and protect them while the training was underway?

What would be the strategic objective of the arming: to equalize the sides or enable the Muslims to roll back Serb gains?

How would the United States react if Iran entered the conflict to assist the Bosnian Government?

How would NATO conduct effective air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions if the spotters based in Bosnia are withdrawn, which they probably will be if the United States stops honoring the embargo?

How will UNPROFOR, NATO, and the United States compensate for the reduction in delivery of humanitarian assistance within Bosnia after the arms embargo is lifted?

How will UNPROFOR, NATO, the United States, and the Bosnian Muslims defend against the expected immediate Bosnian Serb offensive that would follow a lifting of the embargo?

How will UNPROFOR be able to continue any operations in Bosnia in an increasingly hostile environment, with possible attacks from Bosnian Muslim forces as well as Bosnian Serbs?

How will UNPROFOR cope with more arms flowing through Croatia to Bosnia, and the stresses this will place on Croatian-Serbian relations?

What will be the impact on the situation and negotiations involving the middle-east of allowing arms to flow from Muslim countries to Bosnia?

HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
Stanford, CA, March 9, 1995.

Hon. STROM THURMOND, *Chairman,*
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for the invitation to comment on lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Let me comment first on the implications of not doing so. We have participated in this embargo for a long time and, therefore, have participated in the creation and maintenance of an unequal military capability which favors the Serbs and punishes the Bosnian Muslims. I would have thought that the counterpart of an arms embargo would have been an obligation to offset the power it gave to the Serbs over the Muslims. But tragically that has not happened, and the result has been genocide and ethnic cleansing on a wide scale. As a citizen I can only be ashamed.

Lifting of the arms embargo at this point poses difficulties, but I think we should face up to them and face them down, so we can do the just and equitable thing and thereby put ourselves in a more defensible position.

Our NATO allies are fearful of what may happen to their personnel, dedicated people who have been put in a sorry spot by weak diplomacy and an unwillingness to support it with a credible threat of force. These heroic people are now widely recognized as hostages. The flow of pressure in the region now is for withdrawal of these forces. We should not resist this tendency. If and when this happens, the attitudes of our friends in Europe can be changed.

The time has passed when we could help the people who have been murdered and the women who have been raped, but lots of people still remain and are at risk. It is not too late for us to take a more balanced and just position. That should be our objective and we should, by strong leadership, make it NATO's position as well.

I might add that I know from my many friends that it is not lost on the world of Islam that most of the people taking the beating as a result of our policies are Muslims.

Mr. Chairman, everything is difficult and has downsides and problems, but we need to work through these problems to get ourselves in a more defensible position, at least for the sake of the humanity still there.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

Senator LEVIN. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. "Acting Chair."

Senator COHEN. Oh, I wasn't acting before. [Laughter.]

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me just comment in passing, with a brief question because I want to get to General Clark's assessment of the impact of the lifting.

On the question of extending the limited waivers of the sanctions against Serbia, I have been hearing reports from people outside of this committee who are deemed to be credible. But we have actually had some testimony here in the committee, at least in closed session, of what I would describe as pretty flagrant violations by the former Yugoslavia with the promise to abide by these rules, including a lot of movement of fuel. By one estimate we heard first-hand of convoys of as much of 30, 40, or 50 trucks which, presumably, had arms in them going across the border.

There have been stories about Serbian regulars being found around Bihac, in that offensive, even some indication of SAM-6 missiles suddenly appearing, which I presume were not built in Bihac.

Look, the waiver of the sanctions is limited, as you've said. So it is not a big deal. But, on the other hand, I sure hope Milosevic and the people in Belgrade are not feeling that we're being fooled here. I understand that it is possible that some of the violation of the promises is happening without the specific endorsement of the Milosevic Government. Some of it may be happening through the military, which may be independently operating.

Now I understand we have our reasons here, but one of the worst effects of this, long-term—because it is Milosevic who a lot of us feel started this problem, or at least encouraged it—would be for him to feel and his government to feel that they are pulling the wool over our eyes.

I hope that, in extending for 100 days this waiver, we have not sent that message. Can you reassure me in any way that we have not?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will ask Under Secretary Tarnoff to comment more specifically. But, first of all, Milosevic is no angel.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have no illusions about that. For his own practical reasons, he is putting some political and economic pressure on Pale to settle, which is what we want to have happen.

As you know and as you acknowledge—and I appreciate that—the actual sanctions relaxations, which are in effect, are very marginal. It's passenger traffic, cultural and sports events, and some other—I forget which.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have been very clear with Milosevic and with the Serbs, generally, that we expect improved, continued improvement in their enforcement. It will never be perfect.

But also, I think in all honesty we have to acknowledge that a lot of this is done, as you say, with acquiescence by various people in various levels, and there is no question that Milosevic knows about it. We have to deal, however, with the situation as it exists.

The general effect of the border closure between Serbia proper and the Serb controlled part of Bosnia has been to put pressure on the people there, which we want on.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Tarnoff, let me, with apologies, move on to my other question because I am going to run out of time and I do want to deal with the impact of lifting of the embargo, which I think you know I have supported.

I must say, General Clark, that as one who supports the lifting of the embargo, I did not find any of the assessment shocking or even surprising. I think there is a certain logic to what you are saying and, without making a speech here, I think that our feeling, my feeling and those of us who support this is that, because the Serbs have been the aggressors, because they are involved in genocidal acts and this embargo is having an inequitable effect of denying one side in the conflict, who I see as victims, than the other side—though nobody is an angel over there—the means with which to defend themselves, that it's worth taking these risks. But I have two comments and I would ask your response.

I appreciated what you said about the military not supporting the multilateral lifting of the embargo today. It seems to me that most of the adverse consequences that you have described here

would flow from a multilateral lifting of the embargo as well. The only ones that would not would be, presumably, the adverse effect on our allies and the inconsistency of moving against an existing United Nations resolution. But the rest, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces and the fall-off of humanitarian aid, the Serb offensive, the Muslim offensive, all of that would follow. Therefore, to me this comes down to the question of whether we want to offend our allies or, as I would say, assert leadership within the alliance.

It seems to me, citing Mrs. Thatcher, that they are the ones who are jeopardizing the alliance by their position, which I feel is wrong.

But am I correct that most of the adverse military consequences would flow from multilateral as well as unilateral lifting?

General CLARK. Well, I think it's an excellent question and I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to turn again to this question.

First of all, let me say that, when I answered the question from Senator Levin, I answered the question, do we want to exercise a lift multilaterally at this instant. I think all of us agree that what we want to do is pursue the negotiated settlement. But the option of the administration and the clear, stated policy for some time has been a multilateral lift.

I think that it is possible in the context of a multilateral lift to avoid many of the implications of unilateral lift. I think to see that one has to focus on what multilateral can mean. If we have a multilateral lift, we could have Russia siding with us. We could still have constraints on assistance to Serbia.

If we have a multilateral lift, we could have support from our allies to keep elements of UNPROFOR in place. If we have a multilateral lift, we could have support from the NGO community and, again, our allies to keep some humanitarian aid structure in place.

If we have a multilateral lift, we have a much greater opportunity of controlling the intensification and widening of the conflict because we would presumably have, under this circumstance, a consensus of the leading nations who have interests in this area and who feel commitments to it.

The fact is that we don't yet have that consensus. But we believe that we would like to have it.

So I think there is a clear distinction between a unilateral U.S. lift and the circumstances which would enable us to have a multilateral lift.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I hear you and it seems to me that those are big "ifs" particularly the "if" of the Russian participation in a multilateral lift.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If the Russians don't at least acquiesce, it won't happen because they would veto it in the U.N.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So those are big "ifs."

Senator COHEN. Senator Lieberman, because of a Republican conference, I have to recess the meeting at this time. Senator Thurmond is planning to reappear shortly and he would reconvene the meeting. We do have another panel of witnesses to testify. So in the interest of my attending the conference, I will have to declare a recess.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I would not want to keep you from a Republican conference.

Senator COHEN. I appreciate your sensitivity in this matter. I will declare a recess. We will stand in recess until the return of the Chair.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Are you finished with this panel or do you want us to stand by? We would be happy to stand by, at least I would be happy to stand by.

Senator COHEN. I think we are finished with this panel.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator THURMOND [presiding]. We will come back to order. We regret this interference, but it could not be voided.

General Estes, would you proceed with your remarks.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HOWELL M. ESTES, III, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, (J-3), JOINT STAFF AND MAJ. GEN. PATRICK M. HUGHES, USA, DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, (J-2), JOINT STAFF

General ESTES. I will, Mr. Chairman.

[Viewgraph deleted.]

General Hughes and I have appeared before this committee before and we appreciate the opportunity to do so again today. Neither of us has a prepared statement. That is probably a good thing because, being people who are focused on the operational side of things, we don't read very well. We will sit here today and give you our personal opinions, try to go around the world and talk about what we see in the intelligence business and in the operations business, and we hope to be able to answer any questions that you may have.

We will do this by region. We will go around the world by region. We will start with the European area and, in doing this, we will ask General Hughes to cover the intelligence aspects of the region first. Then I will follow up with the operations overview.

European Command

- Intelligence Summary
- Ongoing Operations
 - Able Sentry
 - Deny Flight
 - Provide Promise
 - Sharp Guard
 - Provide Comfort



General ESTES. Starting with the European Command, we will look at these particular areas: the operations summary, as I mentioned first, and then I will discuss in a little more detail than General Clark did the major operations we have going on in the EUCOM area. With that, I will turn it over to General Hughes.

EUROPEAN COMMAND**Intelligence Summary**


[DELETED]

General HUGHES. Good morning, sir. I hope you can hear me clearly. Please, let me know if I begin to talk too low, as I did in the past. This slide I hope gives you some idea of what I am going to say. I will just make my remarks fairly directly to you.

[Deleted.]

Thank you, sir.

DENY FLIGHT/ PROVIDE PROMISE/ SHARP GUARD/ ABLE SENTRY



General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, I will turn now to the major operations that are going on in the European area. The first, of course, as you know, is Deny Flight. That operation is a joint and combined operation involving NATO forces. It is designed to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The second operation, Sharp Guard, is designed to enforce maritime sanctions in the Adriatic for movement of goods, embargoed goods, into Serbia or parts of the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, as well. The only exception to that, of course, is the use of U.S. forces to enforce the arms embargo against the Bosnians, which we are no longer participating in, as General Clark mentioned.

Provide Promise, again, is a NATO operation in support of the UNPROFOR forces and the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina for movement of humanitarian aid, and it involves the U.N. hospital, which is at Zagreb.

[Deleted.]

[Viewgraph deleted.]

The only other operation in the European area—it is considered the European area—although some people may look at it and say it is more the Middle East, but nevertheless it is a European area responsibility—is Provide Comfort. That, of course, is the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq by forces flying out of Incirlik. This, again, is a joint and combined operation involving the French, the British, and ourselves, and involves the size forces that you see there.

Chairman THURMOND. Could you tell us how much they are doing in there?

General ESTES. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman? I didn't hear the question, sir.

Chairman THURMOND. Can you tell us how much they are doing there, their daily operations?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]



Central Command



■ Intelligence Summary

■ Ongoing Operations

— *Southern Watch*

— *United Shield*



General ESTES. Starting with the European Command, we will look at these particular areas: the operations summary, as I mentioned first, and then I will discuss in a little more detail than General Clark did the major operations we have going on in the EUCOM area. With that, I will turn it over to General Hughes.

CENTRAL COMMAND

Intelligence Summary

[DELETED]

Turning now to the Central Command, I will turn it back over to General Hughes.

General HUGHES. Sir, in the U.S. Central Command, [deleted].


I am not suggesting in my comments that I know exactly what to do about this problem. But I am presenting it to you as something that I believe we, as a national entity, have to come to grips with.

Chairman THURMOND. In your opinion, what is Iran's ultimate goal?

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Chairman THURMOND. Do you think Iraq will work with them and cooperate or will it be to the contrary?

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]



General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, now let me turn to the only military operation we have going on in the Central Command area. Southern Watch, again, has been going on for some time, very similar to what we do with Provide Comfort in the north in that we have a no-fly zone established south of the 32nd Parallel.

This, again, is a joint and combined operation involving the British, the French, and ourselves. It is designed to preserve regional peace and order in Southern Iraq.

[Deleted.]

Operation United Shield

Mission Statement



USCINCCENT conducts military operations to support the UNOSOM II withdrawal and the retrograde of U.S. government equipment from Somalia.

There is another operation which will be coming soon. You mentioned it briefly in your remarks this morning, Mr. Chairman. This

is the operation which will support the extraction of the UNOSOM forces out of Somalia and also the retrograding of U.S. Government equipment. That operation is called United Shield, and I would like to discuss it with you for just a few minutes to give you some of the basic pieces of the operation.

Starting with the European Command, we will look at these particular areas: the operations summary, as I mentioned first, and then I will discuss in a little more detail than General Clark did the major operations we have going on in the EUCOM area. With that, I will turn it over to General Hughes.

OPERATION UNITED SHIELD

Concept of Operations

[DELETED]

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Chairman THURMOND. General Estes, what is going to happen in Somalia when the U.N. forces withdraw?

General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a total answer to that. But my guess is—and this is my personal opinion—that the factions involved, as the UNOSOM forces withdraw from key and strategic locations in the city of Mogadishu, there will be substantial fighting amongst the clans as they try to gain control of those strategic locations—the compound downtown that the UNOSOM forces have occupied, the airport, and then the final place we will withdraw from, the port.

The objective, of course, is to ensure that the clan fighting does not involve any of the UNOSOM forces and, in particular, does not involve any U.S. forces. We and the State Department are taking great pains to ensure Aideed and the other faction heads understand that. As we talked before, when we involve ourselves in military operations, if, in fact, that is not abided by, we will exert decisive and very rapid reaction to any attempt to attack U.S. forces that are covering the UNOSOM withdrawal.

To answer your question directly, my personal guess is that there will be some fighting amongst the clans that will go on in an attempt to gain control of the strategic locations that the UNOSOM forces withdraw from.

I would like to turn it over to General Hughes, though, who can give you an intelligence assessment of the same question.

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

General ESTES. Starting with the European Command, we will look at these particular areas: the operations summary, as I mentioned first, and then I will discuss in a little more detail than General Clark did the major operations we have going on in the EUCOM area. With that, I will turn it over to General Hughes.

OPERATION UNITED SHIELD

Withdrawal Plan

[DELETED]

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

OPERATION UNITED SHIELD

U.S. Support to UNOSOM II Withdrawal

[DELETED]

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

*Atlantic Command*


■ Intelligence Summary

■ Ongoing Operations

- *Uphold Democracy*
- *GTMO (Sea Signal)*
- *Counter Drug*



General ESTES. Turning now to the Atlantic Command, I will turn it back over to General Hughes for an intelligence summary in that area.

*Atlantic Command**Intelligence Summary*

■ Secure and stable environment in Haiti.

- Parliamentary and local elections upcoming.
- Professionalization of security forces/improvement in economy keys to success in Haiti.

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General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Chairman THURMOND. I am going to recess the committee for a few minutes.


General ESTES. Okay, sir.

General HUGHES. Yes, sir.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will resume. We have a time consideration here. I want to be sure that you cover Korea and Haiti.

General ESTES. What we will do is make slides available on the remainder of the areas. We will just cover, as you asked, Haiti and Korea here in the next few minutes, and then General Hughes has a couple of comments on Russia, as well, which he would like to make because he thinks it is important for the chairman to hear that. Let me just turn quickly to security in Haiti. May we go to the next slide, please.




As you know, we have had a multinational force, a coalition of forces in Haiti that has been there since the start. There is a military element of that which involves not only the United States but a number of other countries, which I will not go into now.

There are also police monitors from a number of countries. These are actual policemen who are tied to the Haitian forces. You can see "IPSF" up there. That is the Interim Public Security Force. Those are the police that we gave a limited amount of training to, and they are out now conducting the safe and secure missions throughout the country. There are about 3,000 of those, and the international police monitors are with these Haitians and helping them learn the tools of the trade of what a police force in a democracy does.

In addition to that, you see the public safety trainees listed there. Those are also Haitians which were trained at Guantanamo and brought back to do virtually the same mission that the Interim Public Security Force does. And so, the police monitors from all the various countries are with them, as well.

The end state, of course, is the police academy. That will be starting here by the end of this month, in Haiti. They plan to train

about 4,000 police, maybe a few more. They will start taking in students into that police academy, which will last for 4 months of the time, at about the rate of 375 in a class.




The next slide then talks to the issue of the multi-national security force strategy. The idea, of course, was to ensure a safe and secure environment in Haiti for the existence of the democracy. This slide has a lot of information on it which I will not go into detail on at this point in time in the interest of time. But, suffice it to say, our whole objective was to establish a safe and secure environment so that the other actions that need to take place in terms of nation-building could, in fact, take place.

The objective, of course, is to turn as much of this, and eventually all of the business of maintaining a safe and secure environment, over to the Haitian Government. You see that located down in the lower right corner of the slide.

Building UNMIH

(United Nations Mission in Haiti)



Over time, which I will show you on the next slide, the Haitians assume more and more responsibility for that mission.

Of course, we went in with the Tenth Mountain Division initially, and they had the vast preponderance of the job of establishing a safe and secure environment. Haitians slowly but surely have been building up as we have trained them to do this job.

The Tenth Mountain Division is turning over its role to the 25th Infantry Division. That operation and transition is going on as we speak. Then, hopefully by the end of March, the plan is that the U.S. and the multinational force transitions to the UNMIH force and it becomes a U.N. operation.

General Clark wants to add something here.

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, may I say that we just received word that we have agreement that the next commander for the UNMIH force will be U.S. Army Major General Joe Kinzer. That has been agreed to in New York today. So I think there will be a press announcement some time, subsequently, of that. This is a very important step for us. We are very happy to get this.

General ESTES. The transition to UNMIH, though, of course, is only the next step. The really complete step would be UNMIH leaves at the end of the U.N. charter, which occurs at the very end of February, 1996. And so, the plan is between now and then that we use this police academy to build up a substantial, fully trained police force to do the safe and secure mission in Haiti.

Of course, the President has to make a decision about the size of his military. That also is part of this plan as well. That is currently under work in addition to providing this professional police force.

ATLANTIC COMMAND

U.S. Multi-National Force Disposition

[DELETED]

ATLANTIC COMMAND

Non-U.S. Multi-National Force Disposition

[DELETED]

ATLANTIC COMMAND

International Police Monitors

[DELETED]

ATLANTIC COMMAND

Interim Public Security Force

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
ATLANTIC COMMAND

Status of Public Security Trainees

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
Atlantic Command

Security in Haiti

THE FUTURE OF HAITIAN SECURITY IS A HAITIAN SOLUTION


Atlantic Command

Haitian Migrant Summary (GTMO)



Atlantic Command

Cuban Migrant Summary (GTMO)



Pacific Command

■ Intelligence Summary

■ US Force Disposition



PACIFIC COMMAND

Intelligence Summary

[DELETED]

We will turn now to the Pacific Command and talk about Korea.
General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Thank you.

PACIFIC COMMAND

U.S. Forces in the Region

[DELETED]

General ESTES. Let me turn to the last slide we plan to show this afternoon, which is U.S. forces in the region.

We have no actual operations going on there now. These are forces that are deployed full-time into the Northeast Asia region.
[Deleted.]

I think General Hughes has one more area he would like to discuss, that of Russia, just for a couple of minutes from an intelligence perspective.

OTHER ISSUES - INTELLIGENCE

Future Focus on Russia

[DELETED]

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Thank you.

General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, that concludes our remarks. We are ready for questions from the committee.

Chairman THURMOND. General, North Korea is reportedly developing long-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear, chemi-

cal, or biological warheads to Japan and South Korea. They are also exporting missile technology and other weapon systems to rogue nations such as Iran and Syria. Would you give us more detail on North Korea's ballistic missile programs and the potential threat these programs represent?

General HUGHES. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that.

Chairman THURMOND. Very briefly.

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Chairman THURMOND. [Deleted.]

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

General CLARK. Yes, that's correct.

Chairman THURMOND. General Hughes, I'm concerned that there is no evident military change in North Korea's policies to unify the Korean peninsula. North Korea's war preparations are said to be continuing for the unification of the two Koreas—activities on the ground, such as continued deployments of its forces, increased stockpiles, fielding of new weapons, and construction of underground relocation sites.

General HUGHES. That is correct, sir. I do not dispute in any way what you just said.

Chairman THURMOND. General Estes, a withdrawal from land to sea in the face of an armed enemy is perhaps the most dangerous of all military maneuvers. Although the Somalis are basically armed bandits, they have shown themselves capable of inflicting heavy casualties on U.N. forces in Somalia.

I am deeply concerned about the safety of U.S. and U.N. forces in the final stages of the evacuation. If this withdrawal meets with violence—for example, an attempt by armed Somalis to seize weapons or equipment from the withdrawing forces—what policies and what rules of engagement will the U.S. Commander operate under to defeat any such aggression?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. I will be very brief. I'm sorry I missed the first part of your presentation. I was intrigued, General Hughes, with your statement about North Korea, that the one bright star over North Korea is the recent agreement reached about the nuclear power reactor that is going to be supplied. The bright star may be a SCUD lifting off with a nuclear warhead, however. Let me just talk about that for a moment.

I understand in terms of providing the light water reactors to North Korea that a lot of infrastructure work will have to be done, including the construction of road and other such facilities. Do you have any kind of estimate of what that is going to cost in order to accommodate this?

General HUGHES. Sir, I don't believe I should answer that question. I think my J-5 colleague should address that.

General CLARK. We know that there will have to be some infrastructure work done. I don't believe that there is a firm estimate of what that is. In any event, we are not obligated to do that and we have made that very clear all the way through, that we do not intend to pay those costs.

Senator COHEN. That's not something the United States would be making up under any circumstances, then?

General CLARK. Absolutely not.

Senator COHEN. Second, recently Moscow apparently reached an agreement with Iran to transfer some light water nuclear reactor technology to Iran. My understanding is that the administration opposed that for fear of proliferation. And yet, we are proposing to transfer light water nuclear reactor technology to the North Koreans.

I was wondering why the disconnect here. Why is there such a fear that Moscow, in transferring this technology to Iran, poses a greater threat of proliferation than does the U.S. transferring light water reactor technology to North Korea?

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. As do the North Koreans.

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

We believe that we can keep adequate safeguards in place over the North Koreans when we transfer this technology.

Senator COHEN. The IAEA safeguards?

General CLARK. These are IAEA safeguards, plus we will have examined thoroughly the—we know exactly what the reactor technology is and we will have, I believe, developed an agreement with the North Koreans on what will be done with the nuclear material when it comes out of the reactor.

Senator COHEN. Is not Iran also subject to the IAEA inspections?

General CLARK. They are.

Senator COHEN. So is there a greater fear that they will be able to divert fissile material than the North Koreans?

General CLARK. Yes, there is.

Senator COHEN. What is the difference in terms of their ability to do so versus that of North Korea since both are fairly tightly controlled and hard to penetrate societies?

General CLARK. I'd like to give you a better answer than I'm prepared to give you right now on that question, Senator. If you don't mind, I would like to submit some comments for the record on that question.

Senator COHEN. I'd like an analysis in terms of the different approaches between the two in terms of the safeguards that you anticipate for North Korea versus that of Iran.

General CLARK. We will prepare that for you, sir.

[The information follows:]

The safeguards applied to North Korea will vary significantly from those that can be applied to the Iranian nuclear program. [Deleted.]

The Agreed Framework also requires that the North Koreans dismantle their reprocessing facility before the reactors are completed. That action eliminates their ability to use the spent fuel to make plutonium.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards do not prohibit a country from reprocessing. Iran could build a reprocessing facility, reprocess spent fuel and make plutonium. North Korea will not have that ability. That is one of the fundamental differences between how safeguards will be applied to North Korea and how they can be applied to Iran.

[Deleted.] That deprives them of the raw material needed to make weapons material.

The international safeguard system does not place such a restriction on any other nation. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. How much plutonium will the reactors be able to product in North Korea?



General CLARK. I don't have that figure off the top of my head. But what I do know about the light water fuel that is going to be provided is that it is a different type of plutonium and would have come out of the graphite moderated reactor that we are replacing.

The plutonium that could have been extracted from reprocessing the spent fuel from the current is the right plutonium for making a nuclear device. This plutonium that is coming out will not be the right plutonium. It is a different isotope.

Senator COHEN. What about the plutonium coming out of the Moscow technology to Iran?

General CLARK. I cannot address that.

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.] Under the October 21, 1994 Framework Agreement with North Korea, two PWRs will be provided to the North in exchange for eventual dismantlement of its present graphite-moderated/gas cooled reactor program.

All PWRs are considered proliferation-resistant technology. The low enriched fuel elements are difficult to produce and reprocess. Additionally, the reactor design requires operations and handling that make weapons-grade plutonium production and diversion difficult. However, provision of the PWRs to North Korea and Iran represent different milestones for both country's nuclear programs. For North Korea, PWRs represents a shift away from proliferation. For Iran, PWRs will provide expanded nuclear knowledge.

North Korea already possesses a self-sufficient, indigenously developed nuclear fuel cycle based on 1950s natural uranium-fueled, gas-cooled/graphite-moderated reactor technology. North Korea mines uranium, converts it to metal and fabricates fuel. The North produces graphite, builds reactors, and reprocesses the spent fuel in a reprocessing facility. The Framework Agreement calls for the dismantlement of this complete fuel cycle in exchange for 2 PWRs. The North will be dependent upon foreign sources for uranium fuel enrichment, fuel element fabrication, and spent fuel handling and disposal. North Korea's ability to produce nuclear weapons will be curtailed, a net nonproliferation gain for the United States.

[Deleted.]

The acquisition of Russian PWRs by Iran is therefore a threat to U.S. interests while the supply of Western PWR technology to North Korea is a reduction of the threat. The Framework Agreement lessens North Korea's ability to acquire nuclear weapons while the Russian contract can only enhance Iran's ability to proliferate.

Senator COHEN. Do you have any intelligence that Moscow was influenced by our decision to provide this kind of light water reactor to the North Koreans such that that would undercut our ability to discourage them from doing the same for Iran?

General HUGHES. No, sir.

General CLARK. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. So when they see us doing the same thing, does that not undercut our ability to discourage them from going into Iran, which is perhaps even a greater threat?

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. Let me just turn quickly, then, to Russia. We didn't really get into the second slide that you had up there which, I think, forecast even greater instability throughout Tajikistan and perhaps other ethnic areas.

General HUGHES. That's correct, sir.

Senator COHEN. Was any consideration given to the level of corruption within the military itself by organized criminal elements? I know there was fear in the FBI, CIA, probably DIA, in terms of the role of organized crime throughout Russia today. It has penetrated certainly levels of civilian government. I think it is fair to say that they have also penetrated some of the military.

Is there any analysis that you have at your disposal about the level of corruption within the military, particularly as it pertains to the potential acquisition and sale of nuclear materials on the black market?

Chairman THURMOND. Excuse me, Senator Cohen, I am going to have to leave. Would you take charge and wind this up, please, when you are through?

Senator COHEN [presiding]. All right. I am almost through.

General HUGHES. I'll give you an answer now, sir, a brief answer. [Deleted.]

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. And that particular company, group, or organization, is spread throughout all of Western Europe as well?

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. Recently, we had testimony from the outgoing Director of the CIA, Director Woolsey, and it was pointed out during the course of the hearing that here we have President Yeltsin who, several weeks ago, declared, or ordered, a cessation of the bombing in Chechnya. And each day we could tune in to CNN and watch the bombing continue, which prompted me to suggest that, number one, either Yeltsin is not telling the truth, number two, he is not being told the truth, or, number three, he is not capable of telling the truth by virtue of the reversal of civilian domination of the military and that now the military is giving him orders. Do you have any comment about that?

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

I think that all of that is entirely possible.

Senator COHEN. Clearly, if you are the President, you are Commander in Chief. If you say stop the bombing and your general in charge continues to bomb, the first thing you should do is to fire the general.

General HUGHES. [Deleted.]

Senator COHEN. Well, we will stay tuned to all of this. But my own suspicions are that he has lost whatever moral or legal authority that ever existed over the military and that there has been an inversion of that process with the military pretty much calling the tune. This will place his position, I think, in severe jeopardy in the future.

In any event, I have a closing statement on behalf of the chairman. If there are no further questions of this panel, I will adjourn this meeting. I want to remind everyone of the classified nature of the briefing and caution everyone against discussing this information with the press or the public. If you have any questions on what is classified, please check with the staff or check with the witnesses.

Our thanks to all of you for coming to this briefing. Thank you very much.

General CLARK. Thank you, Senator.

General HUGHES. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

General ESTES. Thank you, sir.

Senator COHEN. I would appreciate it if you could get that information to us as quickly as possible, the information about the UNPROFOR forces especially. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]



